Abstract
Introduction
Security in wireless ad-hoc networks is a complex issue. This complexity is due to various factors like insecure wireless communication links, absence of a fixed infrastructure, node mobility and resource constraints [1] . Nodes are more vulnerable to security attacks in mobile ad-hoc networks than in traditional networks with a fixed infrastructure. The security issues of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are more challenging in a multicasting environment with multiple senders and receivers. There are different kinds of attacks by malicious nodes that can harm a network and make it unreliable for communication. These attacks can be classified as active and passive attacks [2] . A passive attack is one in which the information is snooped by an intruder without disrupting the network activity. An active attack disrupts the normal operation of a network by modifying the packets in the network. Active attacks can be further classified as internal and external attacks. External attacks are carried out by nodes that do not form part of the network. Internal attacks are from compromised nodes that were once legitimate part of the network.
A black hole attack is one in which a malicious node advertises itself as having the shortest path to a destination in a network. This can cause Denial of Service (DoS) by dropping the received packets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview if MAODV protocol. Section 3 discusses about black hole attack. Section 4 overviews security in ad-hoc networks. In section 5 the results of simulation experiments that show the impact of black hole attack on the performance of MAODV under different scenarios are discussed. Finally section 6 summarizes the conclusion.
Overview of MAODV
MAODV is a multicast routing protocol for ad-hoc networks. It is an extension of AODV. As nodes join the group, a tree is created. This tree connects the group members and many routers which are not group members but exist in the tree to connect the group members. Multicast group membership is dynamic. The group members and routers are all members of the tree. Every multicast group is identified by a unique address and group sequence number for tracing the freshness of the group condition. When a node wants to find a route to a group or join a group, it broadcasts a RREQ message. Any node with fresh enough route to the multicast group may respond to this request message with a RREP message. If a node wants to become a member of the group that does not exist, then this node becomes the leader of that group and is responsible for maintaining the group. Group Hello messages are broadcasted periodically to check for connectivity of tree structure. This results in increased overhead in maintaining routes
Black Hole attack
A black hole attack is one in which a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept [3] . This attack aims at modifying the routing protocol so that traffic flows through a specific node controlled by the attacker. The attacker drops the received messages instead of relaying them as the protocol requires. Therefore the quantity of routing information available to other nodes is reduced. The attack can be accomplished either selectively or in bulk. Selective dropping means dropping packets for a specified destination or a packet every 't' seconds or a packet every 'n' packets or a randomly selected portion of packets [4] . Bulk attack results in dropping all packets. Both result in degradation in the performance of the network.
Black hole problem in MAODV
MAODV is an important on demand routing protocol that creates routes only when desired by the source node. MAODV does not include any provisions for security and hence it is susceptible to attacks .When a node requires a route to a destination it initiates a route discovery process within the network. Any malicious node can interrupt this route discovery process by claiming to have the shortest route to the destination thereby attracting more traffic towards it. For example, source A wants to send packets to destination D, in figure1, source A initiates the route discovery process. Let M be the malicious node which has no fresh route to destination D. M claims to have the route to destination and sends route reply RREP packet to S. The reply from the malicious node reaches the source node earlier than the reply from the legitimate node, as the malicious node does not have to check its routing table as the other legitimate nodes. The source chooses the path provided by the malicious node and the data packets are dropped. The malicious node forms a black hole in the network and this problem is called black hole problem. 
Related Work
Several researchers have addressed the problem of securing unicast routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. Secure Aware Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR) [7] , Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [12] , Secure Efficient Ad-Hoc Distance (SEAD) Vector Routing Protocol [8] and Ariadne [6] , Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Network (ARAN) [11] , Secure AODV [9] and Secure Link-State Protocol (SLSP) [12] are all based on unicast routing protocols. Also these protocols do not address the problem of black hole attack. Marti et al. [10] have proposed a Watchdog and Pathrater approach against black hole attack which is implemented on top of source routing protocol such as DSR (Dynamic Source Routing). Ramanujam et al. [2] have presented some general techniques collectively called as TIARA (Techniques for Intrusion resistant Ad-Hoc Routing Algorithms) to protect ad-hoc networks from attacks.
CONFIDANT (Cooperative of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) [9] is an extended version of Watchdog and Pathrater which uses a mechanism similar to Pretty Good Privacy for expressing various levels of trust, key validation and certification. It is also implemented on unicast routing protocol such as DSR. These papers have not addressed the challenges in multicast routing protocols which are our focus in this paper.
Performance Evaluation
The performance of a network depends on many factors such as number of senders, receivers, attackers and their positions. The performance of MAODV has been observed in different scenarios.
Simulation Environment and Metrics
The simulation is done using the ns-2 simulator. The metrics used in evaluating the performance are:
Packet Delivery Ratio
The ratio of the number of data packets delivered to the destinations to the number of data packets generated by the sources.
Average End-to-End Delay
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This is the average delay between the sending of packets by the source and its receipt by the receiver. This includes all possible delays caused during data acquisition, route discovery, queuing, processing at intermediate nodes, retransmission delays, propagation time, etc. [5] . It is measured in milliseconds.
Simulation Profile
The simulation settings are as follows. The network consists of 50 nodes placed randomly within an area of 1000m x 1000 m. Each node moves randomly and has a transmission range of 250m. The random way point model is used as the mobility model. In this model, a node selects a random destination and moves towards that destination at a speed between the pre-defined maximum and minimum speed. The minimum speed for the simulations is 0 m/s while the maximum speed is 50 m/s. The simulations were carried out with 2, 5, 7 and 9 attackers for different number of receivers. The malicious nodes were selected randomly.
The performance of the network has been observed in different scenarios.
Figure [2] shows the variation of packet delivery ratio (PDR) with mobility when there are no attackers in the presence of 10, 20, 30 and 40 receivers. It is seen that even in the absence of attackers there is a drop in the value of PDR as the mobility increases and an increase in PDR as the numbers of receivers increases. This may be attributed to the congestion that may occur in the network over a period of time. 
Mobility Vs Pac ket Delivery
Figure2.PDR under no attackers for different receivers
As the number of attackers increase, the PDR reduces considerably. Figure 3 shows a drop in PDR when the numbers of attackers are increased to 1, 2, 5 and 9. In figure 4 , the PDR shows an increase for the same number of attackers as the number of receivers is increased to 30. delivery ratio is higher for large number of receivers for the same number of attackers. That is, the effect of the attack is more in a small group than in a large group. We see that a large group is able to withstand the attack to a reasonable extent when compared to a smaller group which is easily susceptible to attacks. Figure11.Delay for different number of attackers
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Conclusion
Security is one of the major issues in MANETs. In this paper the effect of black hole attack on MANETs has been analysed. The multicast routing protocol MAODV has been simulated with black hole nodes under different scenarios. The results show that the presence of black hole nodes reduces the packet delivery ratio of the netwok considerably and affect the performance of the network. A large group with more number of senders and receivers is more resilient to attacks when compared to a smaller group.
To implement security over MAODV, all route request messages are to be authenticated. Several mechanisms can be found in literature for authentication. Identity based key management process is simple in terms of reduced memory storage cost compared to other methods. Hence a key management technique combining threshold cryptography with identity based cryptography can be used for authentication so that compromised nodes can be easily identified and excluded from the network.
